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FOREWORD
AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON

T

hose who define today’s “conventional wisdom” in Washington
would have us believe that the second U.S.-Iraqi war was a failure. So pervasive is this mindset that, as a presidential candidate,
even Jeb Bush, former president George W. Bush’s own brother, fled
in horror from the prospect of defending the 2003 decision to invade
Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein. And from this conventional
wisdom about Iraq, supplemented by cherry-picked data from publicopinion polls, flows the further conventional wisdom that, in the years
ahead, the American public will simply not abide similar U.S. nationalsecurity policies.
Notwithstanding its pervasiveness, this conventional wisdom about
Iraq is wrong. It is wrong in its factual description of what actually happened in Iraq, wrong about the appropriate conclusions to draw from
that experience, wrong about American public opinion (and correspondingly wrong about how to shape that opinion), and wrong about
the international policies necessary to protect American citizens and
interests in a time of growing uncertainty and indeed growing chaos.
This is not to say that mistakes—indeed, serious mistakes—were
not made in Iraq both before and after the invasion and overthrow of
Saddam Hussein.
Of course there were mistakes, large and small, primarily the assessment of Iraq’s capabilities in weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Without rearguing this issue, which has and will fill volumes for years
to come, Saddam’s WMD threat was not well explained before the invasion. Neither was it understood well, let alone explained well, once
the evidence available failed to meet the expectations raised before
ix
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the conflict. Unfortunately for sensible national-security analysis, the
WMD-related errors about Iraq became public contemporaneously with
post-invasion mistakes (often only seen in 20/20 hindsight) that came
to dominate the ongoing international, mass-media news coverage of
events on the ground in Iraq.
What is perhaps most disturbing about today’s conventional wisdom
is the careless, intellectually sloppy, and often flatly disingenuous way
that mistakes made after Saddam’s fall have been used to attack the
initial policy decision to oust him. In fact, many post-invasion circumstances were neither inevitable nor even reasonably foreseeable before
military hostilities began. There is simply no basis in historical causality to assert that everything that happened following the successful
removal of Saddam was dictated by the initial decision. To make that
point, as the conventional wisdom does, is to contend that the entire
course of events in Iraq (and the broader Middle East) flowed solely
and unalterably from the 2003 decision to remove Saddam. The conventional wisdom must also posit that, absent the U.S. military action,
life in Iraq would have continued essentially unchanged from what it
was before 2003. Neither assumption is accurate or even reasonable.
For well or ill, the historical reality is that the U.S. government is good
neither at empire-building nor at nation-building. (The government is
often not good at nation-building at home either, but that’s a debate
for a different time.) The notion that some combination of the American political leadership, State and Defense Departments, USAID, and
private contractors could re- create a fractured and despoiled country
like Iraq was always fanciful. That job was always for the Iraqis themselves. What America did do successfully, up until Barack Obama’s
catastrophic decision to withdraw all U.S. forces in 2011, was provide
a stabilizing and protective presence in Iraq so that Iraqis could make
their own decisions. That they made a variety of serious mistakes
after decades of crushing authoritarian rule should have surprised
no one— except, of course, the mainstream American and international media, which seemed almost willfully determined to misunderstand and misreport what was actually happening in the country
after Saddam’s overthrow, as Tom Basile compellingly demonstrates
in the pages that follow.
x FOREWORD
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No one book, especially a personal memoir, can resolve these complex issues, but Tough Sell is a critical contribution to the literature of
what actually happened in Iraq and more broadly in the region during
the post-invasion years. These kinds of first-person narratives are
essential for American decision-makers today and tomorrow to understand the fog of war they will encounter not only on the battlefield but
also from the media, especially their own fellow countrymen. It is not a
pretty sight. Any U.S. president contemplating a controversial, complex
policy decision has to recognize that what the media will report will
at best often be only coincidentally related to the reality that U.S. personnel on the ground— civilian and military—themselves experience.
Much of what follows is truly the nitty-gritty of post- conflict communications and media relations, but it must form an essential part
of any politico-military strategy. Some will find it completely realistic,
others will wonder at the ordinariness of it, but others will ask how
anything so bizarre could exist outside of the pages of a novel. That
is why Tough Sell’s narrative is so important. Until American policymakers and analysts fully understand what it is like out at the tip of
the spear, not only in military but also in political terms, there cannot
be an adequate appreciation of the consequences of decisions made
back in Washington.
Even experienced government hands, including many who were
involved in some way in the broader events Tom Basile describes,
will learn from this memoir. And let’s hope the learning sticks until
the next conflict.
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INTRODUCTION
If policymakers do not effectively articulate policy, manage their message strategy,
and counter misinformation, they soon will find themselves unable to execute policy.
That places America and freedom at great risk.

A

ll I could think was that I was going to die. It wasn’t the first time,
but I really wondered whether this was it as I clutched the bottom of my jump seat with both hands. As the countermeasures
deployed, I watched the cargo lift off the deck and felt weightless
during the plane’s steep plunge toward the earth. I looked over at
the lieutenant colonel seated next to me and he was white as a sheet.
There was fear in his eyes. We had been fired upon. It all happened so
quickly, but that incident stays with me. It remains a stark reminder
that no matter what the politicians or headlines say, make no mistake,
we are a nation at war.
It is a constant struggle between those who believe that government exists to provide a few with privilege and those who believe
it is a mechanism to enhance the freedom of all individuals. It is a
fight between those who use power to control absolutely the destinies of millions and those who seek to enhance the right of selfdetermination. It is a war between those who use ignorance as a tool
to produce violence and those who bring the tolerance and empowerment that secure peace.
The current conflict with radicalism in the form of the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al-Qaeda, and dozens of other groups is a
new world war against a lethal, unconventional enemy called Islamic
extremism. No single movement or philosophy in the world today has
the aim of killing more Americans, more Westerners, more Jews, more
Christians, and certainly more Muslims than Islamic extremism. This
1
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conflict wasn’t born out of the imagination of a group of “neocons”
huddled in the basement of some Washington-based think tank. It’s
real, and free nations (including the United States) are still fumbling
in their efforts to counter the threat.
This global conflict, like all modern warfare, is waged with different resources. Territorial wars fought by militaries and nation-states
are evolving into something more dangerous and more complex. For
millennia, the causes of war and the strategies associated with it were
defined within particular margins, involving a combination of resource
and territorial acquisition aimed at the subjugation or oppression of
conquered populations. I suggest that, for most people, this paradigm
continues to drive perceptions of war. One nation invades another,
plants its flag, rapes the land of resources, and controls the population
until another nation or the indigenous people eject it.
What we witnessed in the rise of Al-Qaeda during the Clinton administration, and the decision-making of the United States in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11) during the Bush years was a sharp
departure from the usual war-making paradigm. In fact, we are still
in a transitional phase regarding the way this country handles both its
military and diplomatic strategy to account for this shift.
Gone are the days of the Cold War when mutually assured destruction kept the world in a state of relative stability. Today, we face different enemies around the world who are non-state actors and who
call no set of boundaries home. The state aggressors are still there
to be sure and, since the 1990s, many have assisted the growing and
emboldened Islamic extremist movement through acts of commission and omission.
This more complex paradigm and the rise of pervasive digital media
require governments to evolve also in the way they execute and articulate policy. Now more than ever it takes a broad assortment of people
with wide-ranging specialties to execute effective wartime strategies.
Now more than ever civilians are a critical component of winning a
war on the battlefield and here at home. Our heroes in uniform are
increasingly dependent on the expertise and sacrifice of civilians.
Civilians are playing often unseen roles in the aftermath of conflict in
everything from getting the lights back on and the phone lines up to
2
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developing new government institutions and furthering democratic
reforms. They also play key roles in articulating and defending policy
in our age of digital media. Their contribution to the success of our
foreign policy objectives diplomatically, politically, and militarily both
at home and abroad was felt more distinctly during our engagement
in Iraq than in any other mission in history.
It’s been more than a decade since the United States–led coalition
toppled Saddam Hussein. During those difficult years, we’ve seen all
too clearly that warfare is now more than ever a blend of policy, politics,
and the business of journalism. The challenges faced by the coalition
were not merely between the terrorists and the U.S. military or insurgents and Iraqi forces. The coalition wasn’t merely engaged in a fight to
build a more tolerant, participatory society against incredible odds. It
was also in a constant clash with forces that affected public perception
about the mission. There are those who will dispute the existence and
impact of these forces, but they were real and present. Serious, unbiased observers must agree that winning the war at home was vital to
the success of the Iraq policy. We also must accept that our government
was not sufficiently aggressive in defending its policy or combating that
editorial filter. Certainly, anyone who doubts that the Western media
utterly failed to present a balanced view of the mission to the detriment
of the West’s ability to fight terrorism is simply kidding themselves.
If policy makers do not effectively articulate policy, manage their
message strategy, and counter misinformation, they soon will find
themselves unable to execute policy. That places America and freedom at great risk.
It is vital for us to consider that, regardless of one’s views on the
Iraq War, we may very well engage in a mission like this again. Our
ability to counter terrorism requires our active engagement and that
requires our ability to sell and sustain policy. Within the context of this
war against Islamic extremism, we will likely be forced to engage in
extensive political, social, and economic reform in another country at
some future time. That could involve an extended military obligation.
It may not. Either way, it is important for us to examine the Iraq War
both from an operational and communications standpoint to assist
policymakers in the future. Our failure to win the media and commuINTRODUCTION
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nications war in Iraq has, even in just these last few years, adversely
affected our response as a nation against ISIS and its affiliates.
This country cannot afford to be timid in the face of threats to its
security and the values that keep us free. These pages recall my time
as an advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq.
More than merely being a chronicle about one person, a critique of
the media’s reporting, and an assessment of the Bush administration’s home-front communications strategy, this writing is meant
to serve as a tribute to civilians from the United States and other
coalition nations who lent their talents to the cause of establishing
an Iraq that was free. By way of my own experiences, it is meant to
deliver the untold story of these ordinary people who, of their own
accord, left the safety of everyday life to do extraordinary things for
the Iraqi people. By and large, these men and women who served
alongside our heroes in uniform deserve our respect, admiration,
and appreciation for the risks they took, the price they paid, and the
tireless efforts they made to protect America, the Iraqi people, and
the world. Regardless of age or background, they made personal and
professional sacrifices, placing themselves in harm’s way to help the
coalition achieve its goals.
For more than a decade, we’ve spent an enormous amount of time
and energy debating whether we should have invaded Iraq in the first
place. The more relevant question for discussion is, “What was the
rationale for our policies that guided the aftermath of the initial military operation and led to the creation of the Coalition Provisional
Authority?” From there, we need to assess fairly the decisions of those
first fourteen months.
Once the decision was made to invade Iraq, we had three primary
choices in terms of the direction of our policy in the aftermath. The
United States and the coalition had three options:
1. Remove Saddam and simply leave the country. I believe that
was a false choice;
2. Remove the leadership, then grab some general or expatriate
and impose him as a new leader with absolute power—simply
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replacing one tyrant for another. The moral or political argument fails there as well; or
3. Attempt to secure the country and build institutions that
could support not what some have suggested was the goal—an
American-style democracy—but rather a participatory, pluralistic, and tolerant government.
The Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq was developed to execute
option three. This historic gathering of now often-maligned civilian
and military personnel had the responsibility to establish a security and
political framework that would accomplish this goal working together
with the Iraqi population. The CPA and its advisors tackled this extraordinary task with great passion and commitment. They sacrificed much
and their efforts went unnoticed as the security situation worsened
due to the rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and sectarian violence. The challenge was compounded by a failure to effectively counter media and
political opposition on the home front.
This book isn’t meant to serve as a justification of the Iraq War or to
delve into a lengthy defense of the complex decision-making process
that led to the invasion. However, it has been suggested that invading Iraq was not justified because no direct link was proven between
Saddam’s regime and the 9/11 attacks. The War on Terrorism is not
about 9/11. That tragedy should have served as a catalyst for change in
the way we deal with the gathering threat of hate directed by the likes
of Al-Qaeda and now ISIS and its affiliates. It was supposed to change
the way we fight and deter this modern enemy. Suggesting, as many
critics have, that the War on Terrorism is about 9/11 and, therefore,
only about Al-Qaeda would be like claiming that World War II was
only about Pearl Harbor. Of course, no one would agree today that
our actions in the larger conflict should have been governed by the
events of a single day.
When it came to the War on Terrorism (of which Iraq became a
central front), the Bush White House was faced with the challenge
of handling both the traditional territorial and institutional impacts
of war. These were namely that external forces such as terror groups
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were embedding in and influencing the governments of state actors—
along with the viral nature of the radical Islamist terrorist movement
and the exploitation by governments of the new global paradigm that
emerged after the end of the Cold War.
President Bush believed that addressing the freedom deficit in the
Middle East and in countries that serve as incubators for these groups—
however long-term and complex that strategy might be—was essential.
He believed it was an avenue toward ensuring a more peaceful world
and furthering international cooperation to interdict terrorist networks.
He also understood that it was necessary to employ a policy of active
deterrence not only with respect to countering terror groups but also
regarding the nation-states who support them. Iraq became part of
the War on Terrorism and part of a larger effort of active deterrence.
Where the Iraq strategy fell short was how to fight and manage all
of the various components simultaneously while maintaining public support at home. This mission was not the ejection of one state
power from within the borders of another, or protecting territorial
integrity. The mission became the fighting of a foreign insurgency and
former regime elements while attempting to rebuild physical infrastructure and new government institutions. The administration also
had to attempt to prevent other state actors like Iran from exploiting
regional instability and supporting the efforts of the terrorist enemy.
Of course, there was a media war to be fought as well.
The manpower issues that plagued the Iraq mission early on were
real. For our part, nearly every civilian and military liaison I worked
with—from Ambassador L. Paul Bremer on down—agreed from the
outset that we needed an increase in the number of troops on the
ground to accomplish the mission. Despite poor intelligence regarding the state of the Iraqi infrastructure, the mass looting, and a lack of
indigenous security forces, the Iraq mission realized a range of successes often not sufficiently promoted by the Bush administration and
frequently ignored by the media.
As we look back, many issues can be analyzed and debated, and,
certainly, lessons can be learned. A few things are certain that must
inform our thinking: The world has changed. The challenges we face
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have changed. Yet giving people a chance to be free and self-govern
is the surest way to a greater peace.
We are a nation at war. Unlike wars of the past, this War on Terrorism will require the service of a broader range of participants. Among
them are our neighbors, coworkers, friends, and relatives—people who
don’t wear the uniform but who nonetheless will be driven to fight
with their minds, their passions, their experience, and their talents.
Their boot camp is the battlefront, their bullets their expertise, their
uniform their convictions. Through the successes and failures of the
Iraq mission, history should record the unbending purpose of many
a coalition civilian as a triumph of spirit and sacrifice. I hope it will.
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